Showing posts with label Anti-Trust Violations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Anti-Trust Violations. Show all posts

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Intel Pays Dell Not To Launch AMD-Based Servers - Intel Corp. Is the King of Anti-Trust Violators, in My Opinion

"" 85. A 2003 internal Dell document explains the program rationale, funding methodology, and negotiated documentation, including the following highlights:

“The intent of the MCP program is to provide funding to Dell to combat the AMD threat in the marketplace since Dell is an Intel-only OEM for CPU’s”

“The MCP is negotiated on a quarterly basis.”

“There is not a formal ‘contract’ per se that documents all the terms and conditions of the MCP program for a quarter. Rather, the MCP terms and conditions are agreed upon via email and telephone communications, which are finalized in a spreadsheet that is agreed to by Dell and Intel for a particular quarter.” (Emphasis added).

86. As mentioned in the memo, throughout this period, top executives at both companies took care that the dealings between them were kept secret. Although billions of dollars in rebate payments flowed from Intel to Dell during the period 2002-2006, there was no formal documentation of the secret agreements which led to them.

3. Intel Conveyed Threats To Dell

87. Intel repeatedly made it clear to Dell that, if Dell wanted Intel’s support, Dell would have to direct its efforts against AMD. For example, in preparation for upcoming funding negotiations with Intel in 2002, a Dell executive, who regularly acted as an informal liaison between Dell and Intel, explained that Intel would not tolerate a Dell shift to AMD CPUs.

Specifically, this Dell executive wrote to Michael Dell and others: “If [Dell starts to use] AMD [CPUs], [Intel] would just give a [competitor] MOAP type dollars to match whatever we’re getting – they won’t sit around and let us transfer share to AMD…”

88. In emails and in testimony, the same Dell executive referred to this scenario – in which Intel cuts off some or all funding to Dell and shifts it to a Dell competitor – as a “double whammy.” In one instance, this executive wrote that Intel intended to use an upcoming Dell- Intel meeting to force Dell to discuss how Dell “plan[s] to drive” total market shift to Intel from AMD, and had a “perception that we’re [competing] against competitors seeking Intel CPUs, instead of marketing against AMD.”

Intel Repeatedly Renegotiates Its Payments
To Dell To Ensure “Monogamy”


89. Over the coming years, Intel and Dell fell into a pattern of negotiating the amount of Intel’s subsidies to Dell on a nearly continuous basis. These negotiations were tied to Intel’s aggressive efforts to prevent AMD from getting a toe-hold at Dell.

In each successive round of negotiations, the groundwork was usually laid by mid-level executives at both companies tasked with conveying messages and “positioning” to and from the other so that top executives at both firms would know what to expect when they met.

90. In advance of such a meeting, on June 24, 2002, Dell’s informal liaison reported back from conversations with Intel’s lead negotiator on what Dell’s then-COO Kevin Rollins, who was scheduled to meet with a top Intel executive, should expect at the meeting. Rollins was told by his subordinate that, “[w]ithout being blatant, [the Intel representative] will make it clear that Dell won’t get more MOAP if we do AMD. We’ll get less, and someone else will get ours.”

91. After the meeting, on July 9, 2002, Kevin Rollins reported to Michael Dell that the result of the meeting was that Intel was willing to increase payments to Dell and seemed
willing to do “whatever it takes” to keep Dell from purchasing from AMD.” Rollins wrote: “They got the message that we were very serious this time with our AMD assessment, and seem to want to do whatever it takes to persuade us not to go with [an AMD CPU] …. Initial word is that our MOAP should increase from the $70M this qtr to $100mm.”

. The “Boomerang” Episode

92. Dell periodically considered launching AMD-based products, notwithstanding
Intel’s fierce opposition. But its fear of Intel’s reaction, based on Intel’s explicit and implicit
threats, counseled strongly against any action. For example, in 2002, a Dell team explored a
potential switch to AMD for some of Dell’s CPU needs, in a project code-named “Boomerang”.

The study concluded, first, that “AMD offers a significant margin opportunity for [Dell’s]
Dimension and Inspiron” platforms, on account of price, cost and customer demand factors.

93. But the Boomerang study also identified Intel’s reaction as a “key question” in
the analysis and discussed the potential “opportunity cost” given Dell’s “[e]xclusive relationship
with Intel.” The study asked whether “MOAP [payments to Dell would] increase or decrease?
And over what time period – short term vs. long term?”

The Boomerang study attempted to quantify the projected margin benefit from adopting AMD, concluding that “[up] to 32% of MOAP program could be risked” before Intel’s retaliation, in the form of reduced MOAP, would outweigh the benefits of switching certain platforms to AMD CPUs.

94. The key Dell executive acting as informal liaison between the two companies
commented on the results of the “Boomerang” study.

He warned that the “worst-case downside” scenario is that Intel would “eliminate ~$250M of Dell meet-comp MOAP for some period,” and moreover, that “Intel [would] give this MOAP to competitors to ensure that Intel does not lose [market share] to a Dell AMD [system].”

The “net effect” would be that Dell would “not only lose ~$250 [million], we probably have to do incremental [discounting] on our Intel platforms against competitors who [would] now [be] subsidized with an extra $250M from Intel.”

95. A confirming contemporaneous internal Intel email from Intel’s Dell account representative to top Intel executives states that Dell must be made to understand two things: First, that Intel’s payments to Dell would decrease “if they have AMD in their arsenal.” Second, that Dell should be warned of the “possibility that [MCP] dollars that we’re (sic) applied to DELL could go somewhere else” if Dell starts to offer AMD-based products.

96. The message was apparently conveyed in fact. A Dell executive testified that, at the time of the Boomerang analysis, Intel had conveyed “the concept of their statement back that … as long as [Dell is] Intel only, our discount structure is what it is.” He added that he understood from Intel that, “[i]f there was a change in our Intel only [status], then our discount program would have to be revisited.”

97. Under these circumstances, Dell decided not to launch AMD-based products at
that time. A Dell executive who was responsible for the “analytics” and “cost assumptions” of
the Boomerang study testified to the Attorney General that concern about Intel’s reaction was a substantial part of that decision. ""

Starting on Page 33 of Source Below
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/
nov/NYAG_v_Intel_COMPLAINT_FINAL.pdf

CEO Paul Otellini
More at www.DeniedPatent.com and www.Iviewit.TV on the Evils of Intel...

www.CEOPaulOtellini.com
Intel Pays Dell, AMD, Anti-Trust Violations,
CEO Paul Otellini, Kevin Rollins, Michael Dell

Monday, December 7, 2009

MPEG - as anti-competitive Monopolistic Patent Pooling Scheme - IviewIt Stolen Technology

"Iviewit technologies are currently being utilized by almost every major imaging and video application. These technologies have been at the heart of one of the most fascinating patent stories in the history of the United States and one of the most fascinating crimes ever attempted.
The Iviewit story begins with invention by several inventors working to overcome limitations that were prevalent in early attempts at virtual imaging and low bandwidth video communications.

The true inventors were Eliot I. Bernstein, James F. Armstrong, Jude Rosario, Zakirul Shirajee, Patti Daniels and Matthew Mink. The first spark of invention was in finding a solution for imaging pixelation upon zoom in a low bandwidth environment and utilizing a low resolution file.

In prior art, the user when zooming in virtual images was plagued by pixelation. The iviewit invention in scaled imaging solved for this pixel distortion when zooming in low bandwidth on low resolution, resulting in what is commonly found on digital cameras today and referred to as "digital zoom".

The imaging invention, although discovered in this virtual reality domain has now penetrated every form of digital imaging technology both in hardware and software. The scaled inventions leading to new medical imaging devices, new camera applications, satellite imaging advancements and new zoom television sets as are now offered by Sony.

The second invention for scaled video and often referred to by video technologists and engineers worldwide as a "holy grail" discovery, was the key to unlocking full frame rate, full screen, low bandwidth video as is now found on almost every website worldwide. Scaled video is now embedded in every video player such as the Real Player, QuickTime and Microsoft players. Without this invention video on the Internet, other than postage sized grainy transmissions, would not be possible.

This invention has since transformed the prior art on video content creation and distribution for all forms of video components (i.e. HDTV, Television, DVD, HDDVD) and on almost every digital video/imaging product from videocams, to medical applications, to satellite video and imaging.

The third invention combines scaled video and scaled imaging to form a unique platform of video that can be zoomed into without pixel distortion. The fourth invention was for a remote controlled camera and video applications whereby control of video and imaging inventions from a communication environment could be obtained.Other inventions in digital sound, video and imaging were also discovered around these primary inventions. Patents were filed for the inventions with leading US law firms including Proskauer Rose LLP, Foley and Lardner, Blakely Sokoloff Zafman and Taylor and Meltzer Lippe Goldstein and Schlissel, as well as, leading international law firms around the world.

Or so the shareholders of the companies, Iviewit, thought so.Currently, the United States Patent & Trademark Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the are investigating charges that the law firms herein named have committed fraud against the United States Patent & Trademark Office through a series of fraudulent patent applications with attempt to steal the inventions from the inventors. Similarly, the Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office (epi) are investigating similar charges of fraud committed by the international legal representatives involved. Multitudes of information regarding the inventions can be found at the iviewit website http://www.iviewit.tv/ that in depth information regarding the investigations and other actions can be found.

The main culprit behind these thefts is the video body, self titled, MPEGLA, LLC and their subsequent license known as MPEG, attempting through a patent pooling scheme, similar to other pooling schemes that have historically been involved in anticompetitive and monopolistic practices. Prior strong arm tactics of patent pools and methods to illegally corner markets and steal inventions have been stopped via the Department of Justice efforts.

Section IV attempts to draw conclusions for antitrust enforcement from the history of patent pooling cases and the economic analysis.

The economic analysis suggests that restrictive licensing terms should not necessarily raise competition concerns if patents are not substitutes for each other. However, the cases reveal that many unlawful patent pooling and cross-licensing arrangement were actually cartel agreements thinly disguised as patent licenses. Such shams should not escape antitrust condemnation even if the patents involved in the arrangement are not substitutes.

Section IV notes that the social return from challenges to weak patents is much higher than the private return and ends with a recommendation that antitrust agencies become more proactive in this area."

Later similar concern is also raised;

"Other arrangements have been shams, in which firms agree to abide by restrictive licensing terms as a means to cartelize an industry. In cases such as U.S. Gypsum the patent was incidental to a larger purpose, which was to impose downstream restraints that eliminated competition." http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/gilbert/wp/patent_pools100302.pdf .

Antitrust for Patent Pools:

A Century of Policy EvolutionRichard J.Gilbert
October 3, 2002
In the Singer sewing US Supreme Court case, similar to the blocking of Iviewit technologies by MPEGLA, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court summarized the central competitive issue as follows:
What is claimed here is that Singer engaged in a series of transactions with Gegauf and Vigorelli for an illegal purpose, i.e., to rid itself and Gegauf, together, perhaps, with Vigorelli, of infringements by their common competitors, the Japanese manufacturers.

The Government claims that in this respect there were an identity of purpose among the parties and actions pursuant thereto that in law amount to a combination or conspiracy violative of the Sherman Act.

In the Iviewit case for example, the MPEG codec at the time before invention was incapable of producing a low bandwidth video that could produce a marketable video at internet speeds. The mathematical limitations at bandwidths from 28k-750k produced a horrific video that was not marketable, thus the search for the "holy grail" began for a method to transmit video in this medium that was full screen, full frame rate.

Now the MPEGLA patent pool at the time before the Iviewit inventions was a very small pool with a very small number of patents in the pool and fewer licensees. The pool was begun by a former MIT student and lawyer, Kenneth Rubenstein, who likens himself to the gatekeeper of the pool with his self proclaimed title of patent evaluator for the pool.

The inventors of the technologies, seeing that they had found the grail invention, rushed to get the ideas patented and hired the law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP. A slimy attorney from the firm, named Christopher Clarke Wheeler (recently arrested and convicted for Drunk Driving with Injury ~ Del Ray Beach, FL PD) said he would check if his firm had patent counsel.

A few weeks later he returned and claimed that Kenneth Rubenstein was with the firm in New York and that he was involved in the MPEG patent pool. Wheeler claimed that with Rubenstein's blessing on the inventions, they would be included in the pools and Iviewit and its shareholders would derive royalties from the pool.

Somewhere though, on the way to the patent office, Rubenstein and his band of thieves, decided on a very complicated artifice to defraud the inventors and shareholders and steal the inventions for themselves.

This blog will attempt to expose what these law firms have done in the attempt to steal the inventions and then to attempt to cover up their crimes through manipulation of the legal system that elevates to the highest court in this land. At the same time, these attorneys are under very real federal and international investigations for their crimes.

The only way to escape prosecution will be to manipulate the justice department, the commerce department and the Supreme Court, if they fail, certain federal prison sentences await them.

This blog will cover the crimes and allow for others to post comments relating to their experiences with what appears a corrupt group of patent law firms that has found a way to steal inventions from inventors, disguised as trusted attorneys from leading law firms. Again, the meat of the story and much evidence can be found at www.iviewit.tv where we welcome your comments and any help you may be able to give in bringing these criminals to justice."
r
Source of Post
http://patentgate.blogspot.com/2005/12/mpeg-as-anticompetitive-monopolistic.html
p
More on this Story at
www.DeniedPatent.com
r
Crystal L. Cox
IndustryWhistleblower.com
r