"Posted by Larry Doyle on January 28, 2010 9:02 AM
Who is George Demos?
A former enforcement lawyer in the New York office of the SEC,
currently running for Congress from Long Island.
Who is Peter Sivere? A former compliance employee at JP Morgan.
Sivere crossed paths with Demos in 2004 while providing information related to an investigation of questionable mutual fund trading activity. In the midst of Sivere’s engagement with the SEC, his confidence was violated. I highlighted this reality the other day in writing, “The SEC Pimped Peter Sivere.”
Who at the SEC blew Sivere’s cover? Today we learn it was George Demos.
Kudos to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) for investigating this case and kudos to Politics Daily for highlighting it today in writing, Long Island Congressional Candidate Cited for Giving up J.P. Morgan Whistleblower:
George Demos is a Republican Congressional candidate from Eastern Long Island whose Web site bears the slogan “Fighting for Freedom,” and touts his service as an enforcement lawyer in the New York office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A bio says that he “handled some of the SEC’s most significant investigations,” including that of Ponzi scheme artist Bernard Madoff, and “worked tirelessly on the cases that never made the headlines.”
But one case that never made headlines was his own: Demos’ campaign Web site and public statements omit any reference to a report last March of the SEC’s Inspector General (IG), which found he had improperly disclosed protected, nonpublic information about a whistleblower to the counsel for that whistleblower’s employer, a major Wall Street bank, JPMorgan Chase. The IG’s charges of misconduct grew out of an SEC probe that began in 2003 of JPMorgan and other big financial institutions suspected of illegal market practices.
Demos has denied he did anything improper, and his campaign declined to comment on the matter. But documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) — a non-partisan non-profit based in Washington — confirm that Demos was the staff attorney who was cited in the IG report for violating SEC rules.
The IG referred the case to the agency’s management for possible disciplinary action, but the SEC took no action. Soon after that, Demos quietly resigned from his job and launched his bid for a seat in the House of Representatives. "
Source of George Demos - Peter Sivere Article
and Full Article Click Below
http://www.senseoncents.com/2010/01/sec-ig-report-george-demos-pimped-peter-sivere/
Posted Here by
Crystal L. Cox
Industry Whistleblower
Showing posts with label JP Morgan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JP Morgan. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Saturday, March 20, 2010
J.P. Morgan Chase - TRAVELERS INDEM. CO - Proskauer Rose - Enron Collapse - Bankers Professional Liability Insurance
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
Decided March 18, 2010
"" JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. v. TRAVELERS INDEM. CO.
2010 NY Slip Op 02075
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants,
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
600674/06, 2156, 2157.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.
Decided March 18, 2010.
Arkin Kaplan Rice LLP, New York (Howard J. Kaplan, Lisa C. Solbakken, Michael J. McLaughlin and Elizabeth A. Fitzwater of counsel), for appellant.
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (John H. Gross, Steven E. Obus, Francis D. Landrey and Michelle R. Migdon of counsel), for respondents.
Before: Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Moskowitz, Abdus-Salaam, RomÁn, JJ.
ABDUS-SALAAM, J.
In this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action, plaintiffs JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (collectively JPMC) seek a declaration that defendant Twin City Fire Insurance, Inc. (Twin City) is obligated to indemnify them in the amount of the limits of their coverage ($22.5 million) for losses incurred in connection with the defense and settlement of a series of federal court class action suits arising out of Enron's financial collapse, as well as several lawsuits filed by Enron investors in state courts. JPMC ultimately paid more than $2.2 billion to settle the Enron actions.
The motion court rejected Twin City's defenses, including that JPMC had failed to comply with the notice provision of the "claims-made" policy at issue here, and directed that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $22,500,000 plus prejudgment interest, together with costs and disbursements, all together amounting to $28,358,180.14.
Twin City was a $22.5 million participant in a combined lines program providing JPMC with a total of $200 million in Bankers Professional Liability insurance, effective November 30, 1997 to November 30, 2001 (the 97-01 Program).
Twin City was not a participating insurer at the inception of the 97-01 Program, but, effective July 15, 2000, replaced Reliance Insurance Company as an excess insurer by providing coverage for the second excess layer of $10 million excess of $30 million and for the sixth excess layer of $12.5 million excess of $70 million.
The binders issued by Twin City adopted the terms of coverage as bound by Reliance, which incorporated the terms and conditions of the primary policy issued by Lloyd's, London. The "claims-made" policy afforded coverage both for claims made against the insured during the policy period, as well as claims made subsequent to the policy period, provided that the insured gave notice during the policy term of any act, error or omission that may subsequently give rise to a claim. As set forth in the Lloyd's primary policy:
"If during the Policy Period . . . the Risk and Insurance Management Department shall become aware of any act, error or omission which may subsequently give rise to a claim being made against an Insured and shall during the Policy Period . . . give written notice of such act, error or omission, then any claim which is subsequently made against the Insured arising out of such act, error or omission shall for the purpose of this policy be treated as a claim made during the Policy Period."
An addendum to the Lloyd's primary policy substituted the words "Wrongful Act" for all references to "acts, errors or omissions" throughout the policy. Another addendum defined "Wrongful Act" to include any "(i) act, error or omission by the Insured or any person or entity for whom the Insured is legally responsible, or (iv) dishonest or fraudulent act or omission by any officer or employee of the Named Corporation or any Subsidiary Company."
The record shows that in late November 2001, as the 97-01 Program was nearing expiration and JPMC was seeking renewal of its insurance for the 2001-2002 policy period, Enron's credit rating had been downgraded to junk status and there was speculation in the press that Enron was headed for bankruptcy. According to Richard Straub, Vice President, Corporate Insurance Services for JPMC, the insurers that were considering participating in the renewal program, including Twin City, "began to balk at providing coverage for Enron claims under the subsequent program," because [t]hey did not want to effectively buy a loss.'" These insurers inquired as to whether JPMC had noticed or was going to notice Enron claims under the 97-01 policy, and certain of them made clear that JPMC must provide notice of the Enron circumstances to the 97-01 insurers as a condition of these prospective insurers binding coverage under the new 01-02 Program. Mr. Straub, in conjunction with others, made the decision to notice potential claims to the 97-01 Program both because he was concerned about potential claims that might arise from JPMC's provision of professional services to Enron and because he wanted to obtain coverage for the 01-02 period.
On November 29, 2001 JPMC's insurance broker, Marsh & McLennan, sent an e-mail to the 01-02 insurers, including Twin City, outlining the terms pursuant to which the insurers agreed to bind coverage:
"As discussed, it was agreed to put the expiring contract on notice of the ENRON circumstance. JP Morgan Chase is in the process of drafting this notice and putting the prior policy on notice. It was also agreed, that in the event a Claim does arise out of this ENRON matter, this current policy shall apply (subject to this policy's terms and conditions) in the event that there is a final adjudication that no coverage exists under the prior Blended policy solely due to such claim not fulfilling the notice requirements under the prior policy — wording to be agreed."
Twin City's binder for the 01-02 Program provides that it will follow the terms and conditions of the November 29, 2001 e-mail. Stephen Guglielmo, a Twin City underwriter, testified that Enron's demise caused him concern about the renewal of JPMC's policy because of the possible exposure to an Enron claim, and that as he recalls, Enron claims were going to be noticed for the 97-01 policy and excluded from the 01-02 policy which gave him "some comfort in being part of an ongoing program with JPMorgan Chase."
On November 29, 2001 at 9 P.M., three hours before the 97-01 policy was to expire, JPMC sent the following e-mail to Twin City through its broker, Marsh:
"On November 28th 2001 it was announced that various credit agencies had downgraded Enron, Inc. debt to junk status. In addition it was announced that merger discussions with Dynegy, Inc. had been terminated. In light of this situation J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. released a statement disclosing that it has approximately $500 million of unsecured exposure to various Enron entities, including loans, letters of credit and derivatives. It was also confirmed that it has additional exposures of $400 million secured by the Transwestern and Northern Natural pipelines.
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries and affiliates, and their directors and officers ("JP Morgan Chase") have an extensive relationship with Enron which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, lending, merger & acquisition advisory services, restructuring advisory services, various SWAPS transactions, purchaser of gas/energy and serving as indenture trustee for Enron's public debt. While we have not received notice of any claim or potential claim at this time[,] it is anticipated that we may be named in litigation expected to arise out of the financial difficulties of Enron as a result of the relationship described above."
Fifteen minutes later, JPMC, again through Marsh, sent another e-mail which advised "please disregard the earlier email regarding this matter." The second e-mail contained the language quoted above, but with the following language added:
"Such litigation could include, among other things, allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, errors and omissions, securities fraud, negligence (including gross negligence), fraudulent conveyance, equitable subordination and misrepresentation. While JP Morgan Chase would vigorously contest the validity of any such claims, and has no actual knowledge of such acts, we believe that all of the foregoing constitute Wrongful Acts that could give rise to a claim under the policy."
Twin City responded on November 30, 2001 with a letter acknowledging receipt of the correspondence, informing Marsh of the name of the individual assigned to the matter, and stating that "[i]n the meantime all rights and defenses afforded under any applicable policy, at law, or in equity should be considered reserved." On January 17, 2002, Lloyd's accepted the notice "as notice of a potential claim under the BPL [Bankers Professional Liability] section of the [p]olicy." Subsequently, other insurers did so as well. Only one excess insurer, American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company (AISLIC), asserted that the notice was deficient. AISLIC, which was a defendant in this lawsuit, ultimately settled with JPMC for its Enron claims under the 97-01 program after the motion court denied its motion for an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) and (7).
Twin City never indicated to JPMC its position that the notice was in any way deficient until this litigation, where in its answer it asserted affirmative defenses, alleging, among other things, that coverage is barred because JPMC failed to satisfy conditions precedent to coverage, failed to provide timely, sufficient and appropriate written notice of claims and made false statements in the notices of claims.
Additionally, Twin City maintains that it has no obligation under the 01-02 policy, and has interposed counterclaims seeking damages and rescission of its participation in the 01-02 Program, alleging that it was induced to renew coverage to JPMC as the result of the fraudulent misrepresentation contained in the notice that JPMC had "no actual knowledge" of acts that could give rise to claims in connection with Enron under the 97-01 program, when JPMC in fact had actual knowledge that it had assisted Enron in manipulating its financial statements, and had learned "[b]y no later than November 19, 2001 . . . that many of the transactions it had either designed for Enron, or had engaged in as a participant, were directly responsible for Enron's deteriorating financial conditions."
Twin City initially moved in July 2006 for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) dismissing the complaint on the ground that JPMC's November 29, 2001 letter did not provide it with sufficient notice of the potential claim. The motion court denied the motion, finding that the notice was sufficient. In June 2007, in response to a motion by JPMC for partial summary judgment, Twin City cross-moved for summary judgment, again asserting that the notice was legally insufficient. That cross motion was denied. In June 2008, following extensive discovery, JPMC moved, in this action and two related actions it had commenced against Twin City arising out of Twin City's refusal to indemnify JPMC in connection with professional services rendered to other corporations (the Worldcom action and the National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., action), for partial summary judgment dismissing Twin City's counterclaims and certain affirmative defenses. Twin City cross-moved (in this action only) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the notice was insufficient to invoke coverage under the 97-01 policy period. JPMC "cross-moved"[ 1 ] (in this action only) for partial summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses to the extent that they contested the legal sufficiency of the notice. On March 10, 2009 the motion court granted JPMC's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing Twin City's affirmative defenses insofar as they challenged the sufficiency of the notice, denied Twin City's motion for summary judgment, and ordered that JPMC's motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant's counterclaims and certain affirmative defenses is sub judice and that the remainder of the action was to continue. In December 2008, following the completion of discovery, JPMC moved for summary judgment on all remaining liability issues and damages. The motion was granted and Twin City appealed from the March 10 order and the May 21 judgment.
The motion court correctly held that the notice to Twin City was valid under the 97-01 Program. Twin City argues that JPMC did not meet the condition precedent to coverage because 1) at the time of the notice, JPMC's Risk and Insurance Management Department, in particular Mr. Straub, had no awareness of any wrongful act, and 2) the notice did not identify any specific wrongful act. Twin City puts great stock in the fact that the notice states that JPMC has no actual knowledge of the acts listed, including breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, fraud and negligence, and that Straub testified that the notice was JPMC's "effort to identify the types of acts and activities which we were involved with which, not specific to us, JPMorgan Chase, but as a general situation could, in the financial world . . . give rise to a claim."
However, Twin City's assertion that there was no awareness by JPMC of any wrongful acts, but only conjecture, rings hollow. It is clear from the record that there was heightened awareness, by both JPMC and its insurers in the days prior to the expiration of the 97-01 policy, of the impending implosion of JPMC's client Enron, which awareness led to the last minute filing of the notice of potential claims encompassing wide-ranging legal and financial issues that were almost certain to arise.
It is beyond cavil that the entire purpose of the notice, from both the perspective of the insured and the insurers, including Twin City, was "to put the expiring contract on notice of the ENRON circumstance" (emphasis added). And the notice accomplished this goal, as it presaged the allegations of the Enron lawsuits, including claims that JPMC, as one of the principal lending banks, loaning over a billion dollars to Enron, knew that Enron was falsifying its publicly reported financial results and that JPMC helped raise over $2 billion from the investing public for Enron and made false and misleading statements in registration statements and prospectuses used by Enron to raise billions of dollars in new capital for Enron. The notice identified claims that were likely to arise out of enumerated acts and in the context of the particular unfolding circumstances of the Enron debacle, all of which were described in the notice.
In a "claims-made" policy, the purpose of the provision requiring notice of potential claims before the end of the policy is to provide "a certain date after which an insurer knows that it is no longer liable under the policy, and accordingly, allows the insurer to more accurately fix its reserves for future liabilities and compute premiums with greater certainty" (City of Harrisburg v International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F Supp 954, 962 [M D Pa 1984], affd 770 F2d 1067 [3rd Cir 1985]).
The notice here, with its reference to Enron and its catalog of the transactions with Enron, is analogous to, if not more detailed than, other notices that have been held to be sufficient pursuant to similar notice provisions in claims-made policies.
For example, in Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Heidrick (774 F Supp 352, 355 [D Md 1991], on reconsideration 812 F Supp 586 [D Md 1991], affd sub nom. Federal Deposit Ins. Co v American Cas. Co., 995 F2d 471 [4th Cir 1993]) where the notice set forth wrongful acts including "possible self-dealing by certain officers and directors in the construction of the . . . main office building, and violations of regulations, breaches of fiduciary duty, and negligent acts or omissions by Officers and Directors . . . relating to the construction of [the] main office building and by authorizing, approving and administering various loans and projects," the court held that the notice satisfied the purpose of the policy by giving the insurer a date certain and allowing it to fix its reserves accurately and compute premiums.
In Bodewes v Ulico Cas. Co. (336 F Supp 2d 263 [WD NY 2004], affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 165 Fed Appx 125 [2d Cir 2006]), the notice was held valid where the Trustees of the Buffalo Carpenters Health Care Premium Benefit, Annuity & Pension Funds gave notice that claims would likely be made as the result of the decline in the financial status of the funds and of certain specific instances of alleged mismanagement, "as well as additional claims [that] would be likely to result in the filing of legal action against the Trustees" (336 F Supp 2d at 278 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Furthermore, in Resolution Trust Corp. v American Cas. Co. (874 F Supp 961 [ED Mo 1995]), the court upheld a notice by a savings and loan reporting that a Federal Home Loan Bank supervisor had made statements regarding certain real estate projects to the effect that because of some deficiencies in documentation, if the projects result in losses, responsibility for these losses would be placed directly on the bank's board of directors.
A follow up letter contained the identity of a potential claimant and "very vague descriptions of the circumstances under which the insureds became aware of a potential claim and the nature of claim" (id. at 965).
The court rejected the insurer's contention that the letters did not provide "enough specific information to constitute adequate notice" (id.), noting that there was no requirement of such specificity in the policy.
Nor is there such a requirement of specificity in this policy, which requires only that the insured give written notice of "wrongful acts," defined as any act, error or omission, or dishonest or fraudulent act or omission.
Twin City's citation to Home Ins. Co. v Cooper & Cooper, Ltd. (889 F 2d 746 [7th Cir 1989]), is unpersuasive, as it actually supports JPMC's position. In Home Ins., an attorney who was the sole shareholder of his firm embezzled from accounts held by his firm, casting the firm into bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy trustee made claims before the policy expired on every matter the firm had ever handled. The court held the notice ineffective, finding that
"[i]f the trustee had reason to believe that the firm's work in a given case would lead to liability, it was entitled under the policy to inform the insurer within the period of coverage and to ensure indemnity if the potential came to pass. An effort to lodge claims on everything, to extend indefinitely the coverage of a 15-month policy, has no similar effect; it is merely vexatious" (id. at 750 [emphasis added]).
Here, the notice focused on a given situation — the Enron collapse — and set forth the many different aspects of professional services that might give rise to claims.
Similarly, Twin City's reliance on American Cas. Co v Wilkinson (1990 WL 302175, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 20153 [WD Okla 1990], is misplaced. In that case, the insured bank's notice listed 50 different individuals or entities who did business with the bank, and unlike the notice here, "[no] information was given about the events or circumstances giving rise to these alleged potential claims" (1990 WL 302175, *3, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 20153, *9).
In sum, the notice here was sufficient and the insured met the condition precedent for coverage.
We have considered Twin City's other arguments and find them unavailing, including the assertion that the loss arising out of the defense and settlement of the underlying litigation was not entirely for "professional services" covered under the policy and that there should have been some allocation performed by the trial court in awarding damages. Professional services is defined broadly in the policy to include all services provided by JPMC, including, but not limited to, Investment Banking Activities and Lending Activity. The underlying litigation specified these types of activities as giving rise to the claims. Thus, the losses are covered under the policy.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered May 21, 2009, awarding plaintiffs the aggregate amount of $28,359,180.14 against defendant-appellant pursuant to an order, same court and Justice, entered May 19, 2009, which granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and order, same court and Justice, entered March 10, 2009, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied appellant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
1. The motion court noted the impropriety of attempting to file a cross motion to a cross motion but nonetheless considered the application, in the absence of prejudice to Twin City, which had submitted its opposition to that application. ""
Source
http://www.randywhitestone.com/2010/03/lehman-brothers-private-equity-lehman.html
Folks, don't forget that Proskauer Rose trying to Steal the Trillion Dollar Iviewit Patent and the Enron investments at that time led to the Enron Collapse.
Proskauer Rose gets these companies into the trouble that makes them go bankrupt, then represents them in the bankruptcy.. the Shareholders.. investors lose and Proskauer Rose Wins on all sides of the story. .. and as with all bankruptcy cases - it seems there is no one accountable to the creditors.. Really.. the FBI and DOJ are not listening .. they are looking for the WRONG Criminal just to get an indictment under their hat.
Links to Proskauer Rose and Enron
http://www.proskauersucks.com/search/label/Enron%20Bankruptcy
Decided March 18, 2010
"" JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. v. TRAVELERS INDEM. CO.
2010 NY Slip Op 02075
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants,
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
600674/06, 2156, 2157.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.
Decided March 18, 2010.
Arkin Kaplan Rice LLP, New York (Howard J. Kaplan, Lisa C. Solbakken, Michael J. McLaughlin and Elizabeth A. Fitzwater of counsel), for appellant.
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (John H. Gross, Steven E. Obus, Francis D. Landrey and Michelle R. Migdon of counsel), for respondents.
Before: Gonzalez, P.J., Saxe, Moskowitz, Abdus-Salaam, RomÁn, JJ.
ABDUS-SALAAM, J.
In this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action, plaintiffs JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (collectively JPMC) seek a declaration that defendant Twin City Fire Insurance, Inc. (Twin City) is obligated to indemnify them in the amount of the limits of their coverage ($22.5 million) for losses incurred in connection with the defense and settlement of a series of federal court class action suits arising out of Enron's financial collapse, as well as several lawsuits filed by Enron investors in state courts. JPMC ultimately paid more than $2.2 billion to settle the Enron actions.
The motion court rejected Twin City's defenses, including that JPMC had failed to comply with the notice provision of the "claims-made" policy at issue here, and directed that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $22,500,000 plus prejudgment interest, together with costs and disbursements, all together amounting to $28,358,180.14.
Twin City was a $22.5 million participant in a combined lines program providing JPMC with a total of $200 million in Bankers Professional Liability insurance, effective November 30, 1997 to November 30, 2001 (the 97-01 Program).
Twin City was not a participating insurer at the inception of the 97-01 Program, but, effective July 15, 2000, replaced Reliance Insurance Company as an excess insurer by providing coverage for the second excess layer of $10 million excess of $30 million and for the sixth excess layer of $12.5 million excess of $70 million.
The binders issued by Twin City adopted the terms of coverage as bound by Reliance, which incorporated the terms and conditions of the primary policy issued by Lloyd's, London. The "claims-made" policy afforded coverage both for claims made against the insured during the policy period, as well as claims made subsequent to the policy period, provided that the insured gave notice during the policy term of any act, error or omission that may subsequently give rise to a claim. As set forth in the Lloyd's primary policy:
"If during the Policy Period . . . the Risk and Insurance Management Department shall become aware of any act, error or omission which may subsequently give rise to a claim being made against an Insured and shall during the Policy Period . . . give written notice of such act, error or omission, then any claim which is subsequently made against the Insured arising out of such act, error or omission shall for the purpose of this policy be treated as a claim made during the Policy Period."
An addendum to the Lloyd's primary policy substituted the words "Wrongful Act" for all references to "acts, errors or omissions" throughout the policy. Another addendum defined "Wrongful Act" to include any "(i) act, error or omission by the Insured or any person or entity for whom the Insured is legally responsible, or (iv) dishonest or fraudulent act or omission by any officer or employee of the Named Corporation or any Subsidiary Company."
The record shows that in late November 2001, as the 97-01 Program was nearing expiration and JPMC was seeking renewal of its insurance for the 2001-2002 policy period, Enron's credit rating had been downgraded to junk status and there was speculation in the press that Enron was headed for bankruptcy. According to Richard Straub, Vice President, Corporate Insurance Services for JPMC, the insurers that were considering participating in the renewal program, including Twin City, "began to balk at providing coverage for Enron claims under the subsequent program," because [t]hey did not want to effectively buy a loss.'" These insurers inquired as to whether JPMC had noticed or was going to notice Enron claims under the 97-01 policy, and certain of them made clear that JPMC must provide notice of the Enron circumstances to the 97-01 insurers as a condition of these prospective insurers binding coverage under the new 01-02 Program. Mr. Straub, in conjunction with others, made the decision to notice potential claims to the 97-01 Program both because he was concerned about potential claims that might arise from JPMC's provision of professional services to Enron and because he wanted to obtain coverage for the 01-02 period.
On November 29, 2001 JPMC's insurance broker, Marsh & McLennan, sent an e-mail to the 01-02 insurers, including Twin City, outlining the terms pursuant to which the insurers agreed to bind coverage:
"As discussed, it was agreed to put the expiring contract on notice of the ENRON circumstance. JP Morgan Chase is in the process of drafting this notice and putting the prior policy on notice. It was also agreed, that in the event a Claim does arise out of this ENRON matter, this current policy shall apply (subject to this policy's terms and conditions) in the event that there is a final adjudication that no coverage exists under the prior Blended policy solely due to such claim not fulfilling the notice requirements under the prior policy — wording to be agreed."
Twin City's binder for the 01-02 Program provides that it will follow the terms and conditions of the November 29, 2001 e-mail. Stephen Guglielmo, a Twin City underwriter, testified that Enron's demise caused him concern about the renewal of JPMC's policy because of the possible exposure to an Enron claim, and that as he recalls, Enron claims were going to be noticed for the 97-01 policy and excluded from the 01-02 policy which gave him "some comfort in being part of an ongoing program with JPMorgan Chase."
On November 29, 2001 at 9 P.M., three hours before the 97-01 policy was to expire, JPMC sent the following e-mail to Twin City through its broker, Marsh:
"On November 28th 2001 it was announced that various credit agencies had downgraded Enron, Inc. debt to junk status. In addition it was announced that merger discussions with Dynegy, Inc. had been terminated. In light of this situation J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. released a statement disclosing that it has approximately $500 million of unsecured exposure to various Enron entities, including loans, letters of credit and derivatives. It was also confirmed that it has additional exposures of $400 million secured by the Transwestern and Northern Natural pipelines.
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries and affiliates, and their directors and officers ("JP Morgan Chase") have an extensive relationship with Enron which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, lending, merger & acquisition advisory services, restructuring advisory services, various SWAPS transactions, purchaser of gas/energy and serving as indenture trustee for Enron's public debt. While we have not received notice of any claim or potential claim at this time[,] it is anticipated that we may be named in litigation expected to arise out of the financial difficulties of Enron as a result of the relationship described above."
Fifteen minutes later, JPMC, again through Marsh, sent another e-mail which advised "please disregard the earlier email regarding this matter." The second e-mail contained the language quoted above, but with the following language added:
"Such litigation could include, among other things, allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, errors and omissions, securities fraud, negligence (including gross negligence), fraudulent conveyance, equitable subordination and misrepresentation. While JP Morgan Chase would vigorously contest the validity of any such claims, and has no actual knowledge of such acts, we believe that all of the foregoing constitute Wrongful Acts that could give rise to a claim under the policy."
Twin City responded on November 30, 2001 with a letter acknowledging receipt of the correspondence, informing Marsh of the name of the individual assigned to the matter, and stating that "[i]n the meantime all rights and defenses afforded under any applicable policy, at law, or in equity should be considered reserved." On January 17, 2002, Lloyd's accepted the notice "as notice of a potential claim under the BPL [Bankers Professional Liability] section of the [p]olicy." Subsequently, other insurers did so as well. Only one excess insurer, American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company (AISLIC), asserted that the notice was deficient. AISLIC, which was a defendant in this lawsuit, ultimately settled with JPMC for its Enron claims under the 97-01 program after the motion court denied its motion for an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) and (7).
Twin City never indicated to JPMC its position that the notice was in any way deficient until this litigation, where in its answer it asserted affirmative defenses, alleging, among other things, that coverage is barred because JPMC failed to satisfy conditions precedent to coverage, failed to provide timely, sufficient and appropriate written notice of claims and made false statements in the notices of claims.
Additionally, Twin City maintains that it has no obligation under the 01-02 policy, and has interposed counterclaims seeking damages and rescission of its participation in the 01-02 Program, alleging that it was induced to renew coverage to JPMC as the result of the fraudulent misrepresentation contained in the notice that JPMC had "no actual knowledge" of acts that could give rise to claims in connection with Enron under the 97-01 program, when JPMC in fact had actual knowledge that it had assisted Enron in manipulating its financial statements, and had learned "[b]y no later than November 19, 2001 . . . that many of the transactions it had either designed for Enron, or had engaged in as a participant, were directly responsible for Enron's deteriorating financial conditions."
Twin City initially moved in July 2006 for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) dismissing the complaint on the ground that JPMC's November 29, 2001 letter did not provide it with sufficient notice of the potential claim. The motion court denied the motion, finding that the notice was sufficient. In June 2007, in response to a motion by JPMC for partial summary judgment, Twin City cross-moved for summary judgment, again asserting that the notice was legally insufficient. That cross motion was denied. In June 2008, following extensive discovery, JPMC moved, in this action and two related actions it had commenced against Twin City arising out of Twin City's refusal to indemnify JPMC in connection with professional services rendered to other corporations (the Worldcom action and the National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., action), for partial summary judgment dismissing Twin City's counterclaims and certain affirmative defenses. Twin City cross-moved (in this action only) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the notice was insufficient to invoke coverage under the 97-01 policy period. JPMC "cross-moved"[ 1 ] (in this action only) for partial summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses to the extent that they contested the legal sufficiency of the notice. On March 10, 2009 the motion court granted JPMC's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing Twin City's affirmative defenses insofar as they challenged the sufficiency of the notice, denied Twin City's motion for summary judgment, and ordered that JPMC's motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant's counterclaims and certain affirmative defenses is sub judice and that the remainder of the action was to continue. In December 2008, following the completion of discovery, JPMC moved for summary judgment on all remaining liability issues and damages. The motion was granted and Twin City appealed from the March 10 order and the May 21 judgment.
The motion court correctly held that the notice to Twin City was valid under the 97-01 Program. Twin City argues that JPMC did not meet the condition precedent to coverage because 1) at the time of the notice, JPMC's Risk and Insurance Management Department, in particular Mr. Straub, had no awareness of any wrongful act, and 2) the notice did not identify any specific wrongful act. Twin City puts great stock in the fact that the notice states that JPMC has no actual knowledge of the acts listed, including breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, fraud and negligence, and that Straub testified that the notice was JPMC's "effort to identify the types of acts and activities which we were involved with which, not specific to us, JPMorgan Chase, but as a general situation could, in the financial world . . . give rise to a claim."
However, Twin City's assertion that there was no awareness by JPMC of any wrongful acts, but only conjecture, rings hollow. It is clear from the record that there was heightened awareness, by both JPMC and its insurers in the days prior to the expiration of the 97-01 policy, of the impending implosion of JPMC's client Enron, which awareness led to the last minute filing of the notice of potential claims encompassing wide-ranging legal and financial issues that were almost certain to arise.
It is beyond cavil that the entire purpose of the notice, from both the perspective of the insured and the insurers, including Twin City, was "to put the expiring contract on notice of the ENRON circumstance" (emphasis added). And the notice accomplished this goal, as it presaged the allegations of the Enron lawsuits, including claims that JPMC, as one of the principal lending banks, loaning over a billion dollars to Enron, knew that Enron was falsifying its publicly reported financial results and that JPMC helped raise over $2 billion from the investing public for Enron and made false and misleading statements in registration statements and prospectuses used by Enron to raise billions of dollars in new capital for Enron. The notice identified claims that were likely to arise out of enumerated acts and in the context of the particular unfolding circumstances of the Enron debacle, all of which were described in the notice.
In a "claims-made" policy, the purpose of the provision requiring notice of potential claims before the end of the policy is to provide "a certain date after which an insurer knows that it is no longer liable under the policy, and accordingly, allows the insurer to more accurately fix its reserves for future liabilities and compute premiums with greater certainty" (City of Harrisburg v International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F Supp 954, 962 [M D Pa 1984], affd 770 F2d 1067 [3rd Cir 1985]).
The notice here, with its reference to Enron and its catalog of the transactions with Enron, is analogous to, if not more detailed than, other notices that have been held to be sufficient pursuant to similar notice provisions in claims-made policies.
For example, in Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Heidrick (774 F Supp 352, 355 [D Md 1991], on reconsideration 812 F Supp 586 [D Md 1991], affd sub nom. Federal Deposit Ins. Co v American Cas. Co., 995 F2d 471 [4th Cir 1993]) where the notice set forth wrongful acts including "possible self-dealing by certain officers and directors in the construction of the . . . main office building, and violations of regulations, breaches of fiduciary duty, and negligent acts or omissions by Officers and Directors . . . relating to the construction of [the] main office building and by authorizing, approving and administering various loans and projects," the court held that the notice satisfied the purpose of the policy by giving the insurer a date certain and allowing it to fix its reserves accurately and compute premiums.
In Bodewes v Ulico Cas. Co. (336 F Supp 2d 263 [WD NY 2004], affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 165 Fed Appx 125 [2d Cir 2006]), the notice was held valid where the Trustees of the Buffalo Carpenters Health Care Premium Benefit, Annuity & Pension Funds gave notice that claims would likely be made as the result of the decline in the financial status of the funds and of certain specific instances of alleged mismanagement, "as well as additional claims [that] would be likely to result in the filing of legal action against the Trustees" (336 F Supp 2d at 278 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Furthermore, in Resolution Trust Corp. v American Cas. Co. (874 F Supp 961 [ED Mo 1995]), the court upheld a notice by a savings and loan reporting that a Federal Home Loan Bank supervisor had made statements regarding certain real estate projects to the effect that because of some deficiencies in documentation, if the projects result in losses, responsibility for these losses would be placed directly on the bank's board of directors.
A follow up letter contained the identity of a potential claimant and "very vague descriptions of the circumstances under which the insureds became aware of a potential claim and the nature of claim" (id. at 965).
The court rejected the insurer's contention that the letters did not provide "enough specific information to constitute adequate notice" (id.), noting that there was no requirement of such specificity in the policy.
Nor is there such a requirement of specificity in this policy, which requires only that the insured give written notice of "wrongful acts," defined as any act, error or omission, or dishonest or fraudulent act or omission.
Twin City's citation to Home Ins. Co. v Cooper & Cooper, Ltd. (889 F 2d 746 [7th Cir 1989]), is unpersuasive, as it actually supports JPMC's position. In Home Ins., an attorney who was the sole shareholder of his firm embezzled from accounts held by his firm, casting the firm into bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy trustee made claims before the policy expired on every matter the firm had ever handled. The court held the notice ineffective, finding that
"[i]f the trustee had reason to believe that the firm's work in a given case would lead to liability, it was entitled under the policy to inform the insurer within the period of coverage and to ensure indemnity if the potential came to pass. An effort to lodge claims on everything, to extend indefinitely the coverage of a 15-month policy, has no similar effect; it is merely vexatious" (id. at 750 [emphasis added]).
Here, the notice focused on a given situation — the Enron collapse — and set forth the many different aspects of professional services that might give rise to claims.
Similarly, Twin City's reliance on American Cas. Co v Wilkinson (1990 WL 302175, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 20153 [WD Okla 1990], is misplaced. In that case, the insured bank's notice listed 50 different individuals or entities who did business with the bank, and unlike the notice here, "[no] information was given about the events or circumstances giving rise to these alleged potential claims" (1990 WL 302175, *3, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 20153, *9).
In sum, the notice here was sufficient and the insured met the condition precedent for coverage.
We have considered Twin City's other arguments and find them unavailing, including the assertion that the loss arising out of the defense and settlement of the underlying litigation was not entirely for "professional services" covered under the policy and that there should have been some allocation performed by the trial court in awarding damages. Professional services is defined broadly in the policy to include all services provided by JPMC, including, but not limited to, Investment Banking Activities and Lending Activity. The underlying litigation specified these types of activities as giving rise to the claims. Thus, the losses are covered under the policy.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered May 21, 2009, awarding plaintiffs the aggregate amount of $28,359,180.14 against defendant-appellant pursuant to an order, same court and Justice, entered May 19, 2009, which granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and order, same court and Justice, entered March 10, 2009, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied appellant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
1. The motion court noted the impropriety of attempting to file a cross motion to a cross motion but nonetheless considered the application, in the absence of prejudice to Twin City, which had submitted its opposition to that application. ""
Source
http://www.randywhitestone.com/2010/03/lehman-brothers-private-equity-lehman.html
Folks, don't forget that Proskauer Rose trying to Steal the Trillion Dollar Iviewit Patent and the Enron investments at that time led to the Enron Collapse.
Proskauer Rose gets these companies into the trouble that makes them go bankrupt, then represents them in the bankruptcy.. the Shareholders.. investors lose and Proskauer Rose Wins on all sides of the story. .. and as with all bankruptcy cases - it seems there is no one accountable to the creditors.. Really.. the FBI and DOJ are not listening .. they are looking for the WRONG Criminal just to get an indictment under their hat.
Links to Proskauer Rose and Enron
http://www.proskauersucks.com/search/label/Enron%20Bankruptcy
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Banks face Milan fraud charges - Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, UBS and Hypo Real Estate Holding's Depfa Bank
"" MILAN, Italy -- Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, UBS and Hypo Real Estate Holding's Depfa Bank unit have been charged with fraud linked to the sale of derivatives to the city of Milan.
Judge Simone Luerti scheduled the trial of the four firms, 11 bankers and two former city officials for May 6, Prosecutor Alfredo Robledo said after a hearing in Milan yesterday. The banks allegedly misled the city over swaps that adjusted interest payments on $2.3 billion of bonds sold in 2005.
Prosecutors across Italy are investigating banks as local and national government agencies face potential losses of 2.5 billion euros on derivatives, lawyers say. The Milan probe may also affect cases as far away as the United States, where securities firms have faced charges for price-fixing and bid-rigging in the sale of derivatives to municipalities, though not for fraud, according to former regulator Christopher "Kit" Taylor.
"This case could have repercussions over here if the trial showed deliberate intent," said Taylor, a former executive director of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the national regulator of the municipal-bond market. "What happened in Europe was the continuation of a pattern in the US."
JPMorgan is "vigorously" defending its position against the charges, the New York-based firm said in a statement. "The employees involved in the transactions acted with the highest degree of professionalism and entirely appropriately."
UBS and "its exponents are confident that they will be able to demonstrate, in the course of the trial, that no criminal plot was conceived," the Zurich-based bank said in a separate statement.
Source
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/banks_face_milan_fraud_charges_I0S6vT78W1NjZ6vYKdsXTJ?sms_ss=ema#ixzz0iZNwfl04
Judge Simone Luerti scheduled the trial of the four firms, 11 bankers and two former city officials for May 6, Prosecutor Alfredo Robledo said after a hearing in Milan yesterday. The banks allegedly misled the city over swaps that adjusted interest payments on $2.3 billion of bonds sold in 2005.
Prosecutors across Italy are investigating banks as local and national government agencies face potential losses of 2.5 billion euros on derivatives, lawyers say. The Milan probe may also affect cases as far away as the United States, where securities firms have faced charges for price-fixing and bid-rigging in the sale of derivatives to municipalities, though not for fraud, according to former regulator Christopher "Kit" Taylor.
"This case could have repercussions over here if the trial showed deliberate intent," said Taylor, a former executive director of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the national regulator of the municipal-bond market. "What happened in Europe was the continuation of a pattern in the US."
JPMorgan is "vigorously" defending its position against the charges, the New York-based firm said in a statement. "The employees involved in the transactions acted with the highest degree of professionalism and entirely appropriately."
UBS and "its exponents are confident that they will be able to demonstrate, in the course of the trial, that no criminal plot was conceived," the Zurich-based bank said in a separate statement.
Source
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/banks_face_milan_fraud_charges_I0S6vT78W1NjZ6vYKdsXTJ?sms_ss=ema#ixzz0iZNwfl04
"At SEC, the system can be deaf to Whistleblowing" - I say the SEC has Motives to NOT Listen as they Still are NOT Listening To Billion Dollar Tips.
" By Zachary A. Goldfarb
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Eric Kolchinsky was an executive at Moody's, the credit rating company, when he called a top official at the Securities and Exchange Commission in September to warn that his firm might be violating securities law. He reported that Moody's was blessing mortgage-backed investments that it knew were dangerous, according to a person familiar with the conversation.
The SEC official assured Kolchinsky that someone from the agency would call him back shortly. But the call never came, Kolchinsky later told congressional investigators who were examining how the credit rating industry's failures contributed to the financial crisis. He had gone to Congress after losing patience with the SEC.
Kolchinsky is one in a series of whistleblowers who in recent years tried to tip off the SEC to potential wrongdoing, only to be ignored, misunderstood or left to wonder whether they were being listened to. The SEC has no system in place to guide how officials should handle tips and complaints from outsiders, making it difficult for investigators to take advantage of an invaluable source of information.
This failure helped to continue two of the most celebrated frauds of the last decade for several years, potentially costing unwitting investors millions of dollars. Countless others may have been left vulnerable to shysters because of warnings that went unheeded.
Since SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro took office last year, she has said that fixing the holes in the process for handling tips and complaints has been a top priority. But improving the way hundreds of thousands of tips are analyzed and pursued has proven difficult.
The SEC's enforcement division got back in touch with Kolchinsky about his allegations only after he told the story publicly to a congressional committee last fall, according to a person familiar with the matter.
The SEC said it responded to Kolchinsky's concerns but declined to provide details or to say how fast it did so. Moody's said it examined his allegations and found nothing improper.
The SEC has a haphazard, decentralized system for analyzing outsider information.
Tips arrive by phone, mail and e-mail to officials throughout the agency -- investor education to enforcement divisions. A study commissioned by the SEC last year and conducted by Mitre, a nonprofit group that does research for the federal government, found that the SEC lacks technology to analyze tips and complaints, as well as cohesive policies for what officials should do when they get information.
Whistleblower complaints are one of the main ways that investigators should be tipped to wrongdoing, SEC officials say, along with inconsistencies in financial filings and alerts from financial exchanges about suspicious trading patterns. But the SEC lags behind some other federal agencies in handling tips.
The Internal Revenue Service, for instance, pays reward money to whistleblowers who provide credible information about tax fraud. The Federal Trade Commission has set up a call center for tips and complaints.
On top of structural problems at the SEC, agency officials individually made mistakes in handling several recent cases, sometimes violating agency rules.
Members of Schapiro's management team said they recognized problems with the system for handling whistleblowers shortly after taking over.
"There was no uniformity to it. Every division and office had its own system of recording, tracking or handling tips and complaints. That system was pretty rudimentary," said Steve Cohen, the official tasked by Schapiro to overhaul the agency's tips, complaints and whistleblower program. "We're already working to acquire and deploy technology that centralizes all of the agency's tips and complaints so they can be sorted, reviewed, analyzed and tracked."
No shortage of witnesses
The SEC's struggles were underlined over the past two years with the revelation of two huge Ponzi schemes.
In the case of Bernard L. Madoff, whistleblowers had provided credible information to various SEC units for years.
The most prominent of these informants, a Boston financial analyst named Harry Markopolos, contacted the enforcement division on numerous occasions, according to the SEC's inspector general.
In one instance, Markopolos provided a detailed explanation of why Madoff's business was probably a fraud. Enforcement officials listened, but they dismissed him in their internal discussions. Two former enforcement officials told the inspector general that they discounted Markopolos's information because he was not an insider in Madoff's company.
Then, a few months after the Madoff scheme exploded into the headlines, the SEC exposed a second large Ponzi scheme, run by R. Allen Stanford. But that happened five years after an insider went to the SEC, warning that Stanford might be conducting a fraudulent business.
Leyla Wydler had been a vice president at Stanford's Houston-based company when she first started asking her supervisors tough questions about what the firm did with clients' money, according to her testimony before Congress last year. Her superiors were evasive, and she ultimately was fired.
After that, she went to the National Association of Securities Dealers, a private industry regulator overseen by the SEC. The NASD dismissed her concerns. Then in September 2004, she contacted the SEC's Fort Worth office, according to her congressional testimony. She followed up with a letter to an official there, questioning whether clients' money had been invested in the way Stanford said.
She never heard from the SEC again -- until January 2009, days before the SEC finally filed a case against Stanford, according to her testimony. The agency wanted to know more about her allegations. An inspector general report from June 2009 said the SEC began looking into Stanford years earlier but struggled to build a case against him.
Turning in the Tipster
In one case, it was the SEC that blew the whistle on Peter Sivere, an informant.
Sivere worked in the compliance office of New York investment bank J.P. Morgan Chase. As part of a team helping the bank furnish documents related to a 2004 SEC probe into suspected illegal trading, he found an e-mail that he thought was incriminating.
According to a subsequent report by the SEC inspector general, the e-mail said J.P. Morgan was knowingly providing hundreds of millions of dollars in credit to a firm "in the business of day trading mutual funds" -- which is illegal.
Sivere asked his superiors if this e-mail had been turned over to the SEC but did not get an answer. Instead, he was taken off the SEC project, according to the inspector general report. Sivere accessed his superiors' e-mail accounts to retrieve relevant e-mails, then contacted the SEC. He told the agency that he had relevant documents and asked whether he could receive a reward. He was told he was not eligible, but he turned over the documents anyway.
Sivere informed J.P. Morgan that he had contacted the SEC.
The company fired him, partly on the grounds that he had "sought payment from the SEC to provide documents and information to them outside of the normal scope of their investigation," according to a letter company lawyers wrote defending his dismissal. J.P. Morgan declined to comment for this article.
Sivere was shocked to learn that J.P. Morgan knew he had inquired about a bounty. He had been promised that his discussions with the SEC were confidential.
An SEC internal probe found that an investigator working on the case disclosed Sivere's information to J.P. Morgan's lawyers, violating the agency's confidentiality rules. The inspector general recommended that the SEC official who made the disclosure be referred for disciplinary action. None was taken, according to agency documents.
Retraining the Watchdog
Cohen, who is overhauling the SEC's whistleblower practices, said a database, jury-rigged from existing technology, will be in place this month to centralize all tips and complaints. Officials said that by the end of 2010, they hope to develop technology that would not only centralize the data but also automatically analyze them for patterns to help officials prioritize cases.
Currently, the SEC is setting procedures for responding to whistleblowers and is creating an office of market intelligence to coordinate how the agency's various units respond to tips.
The agency also wants to be able to reward whistleblowers, which it can only do now for insider-trading cases. The SEC has requested that Congress pass legislation giving it the ability to offer financial rewards to people who provide evidence of violations of securities law. ""
Source of Article
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/20/AR2010012005125_2.html
The SEC Gets Tips that Will inevitable Cost Shareholder Millions and they HAVE No System in place to really handle these tips, yet they act like they are taking in Tips and Handling them. The Iviewit Technologies Case will one day explode into Billions in Loss and the SEC has ignored the Eliot Bernstein SEC Complaint - and has know of the Involvement of Proskauer Rose way before the Standford Billions were lost. More on the Iviewit Stolen Patent and what Companies are affected go to http://www.deniedpatent.com/ and www.Iviewit.TV
Why is there no Accountability for the SEC Insiders that let these Billion Dollar Scams Happen then after the Scam and many innocent investors lose everything, the SEC insider gets a a Really Good Job at a high profile law firm. And no one seems to raise an eyebrow.
All these Billion Dollar Investment schemes seem to have the same thing in common. They have a Mega Law Firm behind them helping them, and the Law firms such as Proskauer Rose seem to have No Accountability for the Damage they due to investors.
In the Stanford investment Scandal SEC Sjoblom went to Proskauer Rose - talk about a conflict of Interest - Proskauer Rose seems to be behind a whole lot of these Billion Dollar Scams and they never seem to be held accountable.
In the Dreier Scandal there was Proskauer Rose LLP Attorney Sheila Gowan.
In the Madoff Scandal and there is said to a woman who fled the SEC to the Law Firm Proskauer Rose and that she is fingered all over the SEC report on Madoff failures.
So the SEC seems to hire these lawyers and let them run these scams and there seems to be no REAL regulators of any kind for the ones in place seem to be part of the organized RICO Enterprise of Criminal Lawyers and Law Firms and the US court System does not seem to be able to do anything about them.
Is the SEC Liable for Billions to Trillions of Investors money when it is Obviously, Easily proved that the SEC Ignored TIPS for Years upon Years in all these cases. Time to Sue the SEC. This Government Agent should not be above the law, it is as if they let this stuff go on - on Purpose for pay offs and cushy jobs... and year after year the same scheme plays out and no one seems to be able to bring Justice, Accountability, or Real Action from the SEC to do what the Duty of the SEC is....
Links
Sheila M. Gowan - Proskauer Rose - Iviewit
http://www.free-press-release.com/news-iviewit-trillion-fed-suit-defendant-proskauer-rose-sued-in-global-class-action-re-stanford-ponzi-1252249099.html
Standford - Proskauer Rose - Thomas Sjoblom
http://www.proskauersucks.com/2010/01/thomas-v-sjoblom-allen-stanford.html
Madoff - Proskauer Rose
http://www.proskauerrosesucks.com/2010/02/proskauer-rose-madoff-mary-shapiro-sec.html
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Eric Kolchinsky was an executive at Moody's, the credit rating company, when he called a top official at the Securities and Exchange Commission in September to warn that his firm might be violating securities law. He reported that Moody's was blessing mortgage-backed investments that it knew were dangerous, according to a person familiar with the conversation.
The SEC official assured Kolchinsky that someone from the agency would call him back shortly. But the call never came, Kolchinsky later told congressional investigators who were examining how the credit rating industry's failures contributed to the financial crisis. He had gone to Congress after losing patience with the SEC.
Kolchinsky is one in a series of whistleblowers who in recent years tried to tip off the SEC to potential wrongdoing, only to be ignored, misunderstood or left to wonder whether they were being listened to. The SEC has no system in place to guide how officials should handle tips and complaints from outsiders, making it difficult for investigators to take advantage of an invaluable source of information.
This failure helped to continue two of the most celebrated frauds of the last decade for several years, potentially costing unwitting investors millions of dollars. Countless others may have been left vulnerable to shysters because of warnings that went unheeded.
Since SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro took office last year, she has said that fixing the holes in the process for handling tips and complaints has been a top priority. But improving the way hundreds of thousands of tips are analyzed and pursued has proven difficult.
The SEC's enforcement division got back in touch with Kolchinsky about his allegations only after he told the story publicly to a congressional committee last fall, according to a person familiar with the matter.
The SEC said it responded to Kolchinsky's concerns but declined to provide details or to say how fast it did so. Moody's said it examined his allegations and found nothing improper.
The SEC has a haphazard, decentralized system for analyzing outsider information.
Tips arrive by phone, mail and e-mail to officials throughout the agency -- investor education to enforcement divisions. A study commissioned by the SEC last year and conducted by Mitre, a nonprofit group that does research for the federal government, found that the SEC lacks technology to analyze tips and complaints, as well as cohesive policies for what officials should do when they get information.
Whistleblower complaints are one of the main ways that investigators should be tipped to wrongdoing, SEC officials say, along with inconsistencies in financial filings and alerts from financial exchanges about suspicious trading patterns. But the SEC lags behind some other federal agencies in handling tips.
The Internal Revenue Service, for instance, pays reward money to whistleblowers who provide credible information about tax fraud. The Federal Trade Commission has set up a call center for tips and complaints.
On top of structural problems at the SEC, agency officials individually made mistakes in handling several recent cases, sometimes violating agency rules.
Members of Schapiro's management team said they recognized problems with the system for handling whistleblowers shortly after taking over.
"There was no uniformity to it. Every division and office had its own system of recording, tracking or handling tips and complaints. That system was pretty rudimentary," said Steve Cohen, the official tasked by Schapiro to overhaul the agency's tips, complaints and whistleblower program. "We're already working to acquire and deploy technology that centralizes all of the agency's tips and complaints so they can be sorted, reviewed, analyzed and tracked."
No shortage of witnesses
The SEC's struggles were underlined over the past two years with the revelation of two huge Ponzi schemes.
In the case of Bernard L. Madoff, whistleblowers had provided credible information to various SEC units for years.
The most prominent of these informants, a Boston financial analyst named Harry Markopolos, contacted the enforcement division on numerous occasions, according to the SEC's inspector general.
In one instance, Markopolos provided a detailed explanation of why Madoff's business was probably a fraud. Enforcement officials listened, but they dismissed him in their internal discussions. Two former enforcement officials told the inspector general that they discounted Markopolos's information because he was not an insider in Madoff's company.
Then, a few months after the Madoff scheme exploded into the headlines, the SEC exposed a second large Ponzi scheme, run by R. Allen Stanford. But that happened five years after an insider went to the SEC, warning that Stanford might be conducting a fraudulent business.
Leyla Wydler had been a vice president at Stanford's Houston-based company when she first started asking her supervisors tough questions about what the firm did with clients' money, according to her testimony before Congress last year. Her superiors were evasive, and she ultimately was fired.
After that, she went to the National Association of Securities Dealers, a private industry regulator overseen by the SEC. The NASD dismissed her concerns. Then in September 2004, she contacted the SEC's Fort Worth office, according to her congressional testimony. She followed up with a letter to an official there, questioning whether clients' money had been invested in the way Stanford said.
She never heard from the SEC again -- until January 2009, days before the SEC finally filed a case against Stanford, according to her testimony. The agency wanted to know more about her allegations. An inspector general report from June 2009 said the SEC began looking into Stanford years earlier but struggled to build a case against him.
Turning in the Tipster
In one case, it was the SEC that blew the whistle on Peter Sivere, an informant.
Sivere worked in the compliance office of New York investment bank J.P. Morgan Chase. As part of a team helping the bank furnish documents related to a 2004 SEC probe into suspected illegal trading, he found an e-mail that he thought was incriminating.
According to a subsequent report by the SEC inspector general, the e-mail said J.P. Morgan was knowingly providing hundreds of millions of dollars in credit to a firm "in the business of day trading mutual funds" -- which is illegal.
Sivere asked his superiors if this e-mail had been turned over to the SEC but did not get an answer. Instead, he was taken off the SEC project, according to the inspector general report. Sivere accessed his superiors' e-mail accounts to retrieve relevant e-mails, then contacted the SEC. He told the agency that he had relevant documents and asked whether he could receive a reward. He was told he was not eligible, but he turned over the documents anyway.
Sivere informed J.P. Morgan that he had contacted the SEC.
The company fired him, partly on the grounds that he had "sought payment from the SEC to provide documents and information to them outside of the normal scope of their investigation," according to a letter company lawyers wrote defending his dismissal. J.P. Morgan declined to comment for this article.
Sivere was shocked to learn that J.P. Morgan knew he had inquired about a bounty. He had been promised that his discussions with the SEC were confidential.
An SEC internal probe found that an investigator working on the case disclosed Sivere's information to J.P. Morgan's lawyers, violating the agency's confidentiality rules. The inspector general recommended that the SEC official who made the disclosure be referred for disciplinary action. None was taken, according to agency documents.
Retraining the Watchdog
Cohen, who is overhauling the SEC's whistleblower practices, said a database, jury-rigged from existing technology, will be in place this month to centralize all tips and complaints. Officials said that by the end of 2010, they hope to develop technology that would not only centralize the data but also automatically analyze them for patterns to help officials prioritize cases.
Currently, the SEC is setting procedures for responding to whistleblowers and is creating an office of market intelligence to coordinate how the agency's various units respond to tips.
The agency also wants to be able to reward whistleblowers, which it can only do now for insider-trading cases. The SEC has requested that Congress pass legislation giving it the ability to offer financial rewards to people who provide evidence of violations of securities law. ""
Source of Article
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/20/AR2010012005125_2.html
The SEC Gets Tips that Will inevitable Cost Shareholder Millions and they HAVE No System in place to really handle these tips, yet they act like they are taking in Tips and Handling them. The Iviewit Technologies Case will one day explode into Billions in Loss and the SEC has ignored the Eliot Bernstein SEC Complaint - and has know of the Involvement of Proskauer Rose way before the Standford Billions were lost. More on the Iviewit Stolen Patent and what Companies are affected go to http://www.deniedpatent.com/ and www.Iviewit.TV
Why is there no Accountability for the SEC Insiders that let these Billion Dollar Scams Happen then after the Scam and many innocent investors lose everything, the SEC insider gets a a Really Good Job at a high profile law firm. And no one seems to raise an eyebrow.
All these Billion Dollar Investment schemes seem to have the same thing in common. They have a Mega Law Firm behind them helping them, and the Law firms such as Proskauer Rose seem to have No Accountability for the Damage they due to investors.
In the Stanford investment Scandal SEC Sjoblom went to Proskauer Rose - talk about a conflict of Interest - Proskauer Rose seems to be behind a whole lot of these Billion Dollar Scams and they never seem to be held accountable.
In the Dreier Scandal there was Proskauer Rose LLP Attorney Sheila Gowan.
In the Madoff Scandal and there is said to a woman who fled the SEC to the Law Firm Proskauer Rose and that she is fingered all over the SEC report on Madoff failures.
So the SEC seems to hire these lawyers and let them run these scams and there seems to be no REAL regulators of any kind for the ones in place seem to be part of the organized RICO Enterprise of Criminal Lawyers and Law Firms and the US court System does not seem to be able to do anything about them.
Is the SEC Liable for Billions to Trillions of Investors money when it is Obviously, Easily proved that the SEC Ignored TIPS for Years upon Years in all these cases. Time to Sue the SEC. This Government Agent should not be above the law, it is as if they let this stuff go on - on Purpose for pay offs and cushy jobs... and year after year the same scheme plays out and no one seems to be able to bring Justice, Accountability, or Real Action from the SEC to do what the Duty of the SEC is....
Links
Sheila M. Gowan - Proskauer Rose - Iviewit
http://www.free-press-release.com/news-iviewit-trillion-fed-suit-defendant-proskauer-rose-sued-in-global-class-action-re-stanford-ponzi-1252249099.html
Standford - Proskauer Rose - Thomas Sjoblom
http://www.proskauersucks.com/2010/01/thomas-v-sjoblom-allen-stanford.html
Madoff - Proskauer Rose
http://www.proskauerrosesucks.com/2010/02/proskauer-rose-madoff-mary-shapiro-sec.html
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Whistleblower Peter Sivere Provides Affidavit to OSHA and DOL
DOL OSHA asked that Peter Sivere provide an affidavit to them after they "heard" that the SEC said Peter Sivere requested payment for documents and information.
Click Here for Peter Siver Affidavit
""... On September 30th 2004, the Wall Street Journal.. published an article entitled Trading Class Action Suit Widens. The WSJ articl state, in part, that: Mr. Stern (of Canary Capital) asked a J.P. Morgan Banker who had been working with Mr. Stern's family for a loan to finance his hedge funds trading in the PBHG funds.
The Suit contends that Mr. Stern explained his trading systme "in detail" to the executive.
According to the lawsuit, J.P. Morgan Securities made loans to business entities tied to Canary totalling as much as $105 Million. These Loans were made to finance trades that would make Canary money when the price of PBHG funds declined.
This Subject of the WSJ article appears to be consistent with the information in the Kelleher Email.
... After the September 30th, 2004 WSJ article was published, I continued to do strategic surveillance together with my interim monitoring duties.
.. On or about October 5, 2004, I located an October 4, 2004 email in which a JPM executive referring to the September 30, 2004 WSJ article, inquires about JMP's relationship with Canary.
The Email indicates that Mr. Palmer and Davis Polk and Wardell had previously indicated that JPM had no knowledge of improper trading practices. In a response to the E-mail Mr. Palmer acknowledged that JPM assisted Canary by providing a line of credit to finance Canary's mutual fund trading.
On October 6, 2004, I located an E-mail in which JPM's President and Chief Operating Officer asked JPM's Co-General Counsel about JPM's Relationship with Canary.
On October 7, 2004, I was Terminated for Alleged inappropriate use of the firms E-mail and for not cooperating with an internal fraud investigation. The Emails referred to above were on my desk at JPM at the time I was terminated. I was not permitted to return to my desk after I was terminated... ""
Read this Full Document Click HERE
Click Here for Peter Siver Affidavit
""... On September 30th 2004, the Wall Street Journal.. published an article entitled Trading Class Action Suit Widens. The WSJ articl state, in part, that: Mr. Stern (of Canary Capital) asked a J.P. Morgan Banker who had been working with Mr. Stern's family for a loan to finance his hedge funds trading in the PBHG funds.
The Suit contends that Mr. Stern explained his trading systme "in detail" to the executive.
According to the lawsuit, J.P. Morgan Securities made loans to business entities tied to Canary totalling as much as $105 Million. These Loans were made to finance trades that would make Canary money when the price of PBHG funds declined.
This Subject of the WSJ article appears to be consistent with the information in the Kelleher Email.
... After the September 30th, 2004 WSJ article was published, I continued to do strategic surveillance together with my interim monitoring duties.
.. On or about October 5, 2004, I located an October 4, 2004 email in which a JPM executive referring to the September 30, 2004 WSJ article, inquires about JMP's relationship with Canary.
The Email indicates that Mr. Palmer and Davis Polk and Wardell had previously indicated that JPM had no knowledge of improper trading practices. In a response to the E-mail Mr. Palmer acknowledged that JPM assisted Canary by providing a line of credit to finance Canary's mutual fund trading.
On October 6, 2004, I located an E-mail in which JPM's President and Chief Operating Officer asked JPM's Co-General Counsel about JPM's Relationship with Canary.
On October 7, 2004, I was Terminated for Alleged inappropriate use of the firms E-mail and for not cooperating with an internal fraud investigation. The Emails referred to above were on my desk at JPM at the time I was terminated. I was not permitted to return to my desk after I was terminated... ""
Read this Full Document Click HERE
Peter Z. Sivere v. JP Morgan Chase - Department of Labor - OSHA - SEC - Canary Capital - Davis Polk - JPM Chase
August 2005 Archives
Inside the JP Morgan, Peter Sivere Whistleblower Case
"Civil Action to Protect Against Retaliation in Fraud Cases"
Lisa M. Wells - JPM Chase
Sarbanes - Oxley
Jamie Dimon
Davis Polk Investigations
When Loans were made and What We did about it...
JP Morgan provided a $150 Milloin Line of Credit to a Canary Entity Structured for Canary a series of short equity basket swaps that allowed Canary to hedge its long position in third party mutual funds.
Plaintiffs allege that JPM has liability as financier of some Canary Market timeing and late trading. ... Davis Polk seems to have claimed, in their investigation that JPM had no knowledge of late trading or improper timing...
Heritage Bank One ..
What are the Conflicts of Interest, Attorneys Protecting Each Other.. Isn't Davis Polk connected to Proskauer Rose Somehow??
Canary Capital Litigation
Investment Banking Exposure
TS&S / Investment Management Exposure
Click Here for Full Document
Inside the JP Morgan, Peter Sivere Whistleblower Case
"Civil Action to Protect Against Retaliation in Fraud Cases"
Lisa M. Wells - JPM Chase
Sarbanes - Oxley
Jamie Dimon
Davis Polk Investigations
When Loans were made and What We did about it...
JP Morgan provided a $150 Milloin Line of Credit to a Canary Entity Structured for Canary a series of short equity basket swaps that allowed Canary to hedge its long position in third party mutual funds.
Plaintiffs allege that JPM has liability as financier of some Canary Market timeing and late trading. ... Davis Polk seems to have claimed, in their investigation that JPM had no knowledge of late trading or improper timing...
Heritage Bank One ..
What are the Conflicts of Interest, Attorneys Protecting Each Other.. Isn't Davis Polk connected to Proskauer Rose Somehow??
Canary Capital Litigation
Investment Banking Exposure
TS&S / Investment Management Exposure
Click Here for Full Document
J. Huntley Palmer Lead In House Attorney JP Morgan - Whistleblower Peter Sivere
J. Huntley Palmer was the lead in house attorney at JPM, JP Morgan when J. Huntley Palmer removed 8 people from Whistleblower Peter Sivere's team and replaced them with Davis Polk Team. Looks like he is on the short list for US Attorney in Philadelphia. Sources say his name was one of several submitted to the White House for consideration.
"" Posted on Thu, Jan. 7, 2010
Specter blamed for delay in Obama's naming U.S. att'y
By MICHAEL HINKELMAN
Philadelphia Daily News
hinkelm@phillynews.com
215-854-2656
By this date eight years ago, the then-new U.S. attorney in Philadelphia, Patrick Meehan, had been on the job almost four months, after being confirmed by the U.S. Senate in September 2001.
Now, almost a year into President Obama's term, there is not even a nominee for the post. And the appointment of a new U.S. attorney, which is considered a plum assignment, is not believed to be imminent, sources familiar with the process say.
Some blame the ambling pace on unusual political circumstances.
Traditionally, the state's senior senator of the president's party, in this case Sen. Bob Casey, makes a recommendation to the White House. However, when longtime Republican Sen. Arlen Specter switched parties last April and became a Democrat, that complicated the selection process, sources said.
Sources said that Casey and Specter could not agree on a single candidate to recommend to Obama, who makes the formal nomination.
An initial screening process last summer produced a list of 20 names for U.S. attorney here.
With Casey and Specter unable to settle on one, several names were jointly submitted to the White House last month, sources said.
A source with knowledge of the matter declined to say how many names were submitted or to identify them.
Among those thought to be on a short list, sources said, are Cheryl A. Krause, a partner at Dechert LLP; James J. Eisenhower, a partner at Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP; and J. Huntley Palmer of JP Morgan Chase & Co. All were once federal prosecutors here.
Krause, Eisenhower and Palmer declined to comment for this story.
Justice Department spokeswoman Melissa Schwartz would neither confirm nor deny whether the Justice Department had received any names from the White House or begun vetting any candidates.
Larry Smar, a spokesman for Casey, said, "As of right now, I don't have a sense of when a nomination will be made."
A spokeswoman for Specter declined to comment.
The U.S. attorney here - one of 93 in the country - brings criminal and civil actions on behalf of the federal government in the nine-county area of southeastern Pennsylvania.
The office has prosecuted a number of high-profile public-corruption cases in recent years, including that of former state Sen. Vince Fumo and former City Councilman Rick Mariano.
Former U.S. Attorney Meehan resigned his post in July 2008. The current U.S. attorney, Michael L. Levy, was named by the Justice Department on an interim basis last May to serve as U.S. attorney until Obama nominated a successor.
When the White House receives a senatorial recommendation, it is sent to the Justice Department for vetting.
Schwartz said the vetting process - which includes background checks and interviews by political and career officials - can typically take up to three months.
Once a finalist is determined, that person is interviewed by Attorney General Eric Holder, who makes a recommendation to Obama.
After Obama makes the formal nomination, it is sent to the Senate for confirmation.
And there's no certainty that a nominee - given the current partisan rancor in the Senate - will win timely confirmation.
Case in point: New Jersey's new U.S. attorney, Paul Fishman, was recommended to Obama last February and was nominated by the White House in May, but not confirmed by the Senate until Oct. 7.
According to the Web site Main Justice, an independent news organization that covers the Justice Department, 31 new U.S. attorneys have been confirmed by the Senate, 12 more have been nominated by Obama and another 23 names have been recommended by senators to Obama for U.S. attorney posts throughout the country.
None of those confirmed or nominated to date are holdovers from the Bush administration, although two Bush holdovers have been recommended to Oba-ma. ""
Source
http://www.philly.com/philly/hp/news_update/80882337.html?cmpid=15585797
"" Posted on Thu, Jan. 7, 2010
Specter blamed for delay in Obama's naming U.S. att'y
By MICHAEL HINKELMAN
Philadelphia Daily News
hinkelm@phillynews.com
215-854-2656
By this date eight years ago, the then-new U.S. attorney in Philadelphia, Patrick Meehan, had been on the job almost four months, after being confirmed by the U.S. Senate in September 2001.
Now, almost a year into President Obama's term, there is not even a nominee for the post. And the appointment of a new U.S. attorney, which is considered a plum assignment, is not believed to be imminent, sources familiar with the process say.
Some blame the ambling pace on unusual political circumstances.
Traditionally, the state's senior senator of the president's party, in this case Sen. Bob Casey, makes a recommendation to the White House. However, when longtime Republican Sen. Arlen Specter switched parties last April and became a Democrat, that complicated the selection process, sources said.
Sources said that Casey and Specter could not agree on a single candidate to recommend to Obama, who makes the formal nomination.
An initial screening process last summer produced a list of 20 names for U.S. attorney here.
With Casey and Specter unable to settle on one, several names were jointly submitted to the White House last month, sources said.
A source with knowledge of the matter declined to say how many names were submitted or to identify them.
Among those thought to be on a short list, sources said, are Cheryl A. Krause, a partner at Dechert LLP; James J. Eisenhower, a partner at Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP; and J. Huntley Palmer of JP Morgan Chase & Co. All were once federal prosecutors here.
Krause, Eisenhower and Palmer declined to comment for this story.
Justice Department spokeswoman Melissa Schwartz would neither confirm nor deny whether the Justice Department had received any names from the White House or begun vetting any candidates.
Larry Smar, a spokesman for Casey, said, "As of right now, I don't have a sense of when a nomination will be made."
A spokeswoman for Specter declined to comment.
The U.S. attorney here - one of 93 in the country - brings criminal and civil actions on behalf of the federal government in the nine-county area of southeastern Pennsylvania.
The office has prosecuted a number of high-profile public-corruption cases in recent years, including that of former state Sen. Vince Fumo and former City Councilman Rick Mariano.
Former U.S. Attorney Meehan resigned his post in July 2008. The current U.S. attorney, Michael L. Levy, was named by the Justice Department on an interim basis last May to serve as U.S. attorney until Obama nominated a successor.
When the White House receives a senatorial recommendation, it is sent to the Justice Department for vetting.
Schwartz said the vetting process - which includes background checks and interviews by political and career officials - can typically take up to three months.
Once a finalist is determined, that person is interviewed by Attorney General Eric Holder, who makes a recommendation to Obama.
After Obama makes the formal nomination, it is sent to the Senate for confirmation.
And there's no certainty that a nominee - given the current partisan rancor in the Senate - will win timely confirmation.
Case in point: New Jersey's new U.S. attorney, Paul Fishman, was recommended to Obama last February and was nominated by the White House in May, but not confirmed by the Senate until Oct. 7.
According to the Web site Main Justice, an independent news organization that covers the Justice Department, 31 new U.S. attorneys have been confirmed by the Senate, 12 more have been nominated by Obama and another 23 names have been recommended by senators to Obama for U.S. attorney posts throughout the country.
None of those confirmed or nominated to date are holdovers from the Bush administration, although two Bush holdovers have been recommended to Oba-ma. ""
Source
http://www.philly.com/philly/hp/news_update/80882337.html?cmpid=15585797
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Long Island Congressional Candidate Cited for Giving Up JPMorgan Whistleblower
""George Demos is a Republican Congressional Candidate from Eastern Long Island whose Web site bears the slogan "Fighting for Freedom," and touts his service as an enforcement lawyer in the New York office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A bio says that he "handled some of the SEC's most significant investigations," including that of Ponzi scheme artist Bernard Madoff, and "worked tirelessly on the cases that never made the headlines."
But one case that never made headlines was his own: Demos' campaign Web site and public statements omit any reference to a report last March of the SEC's Inspector General (IG), which found he had improperly disclosed protected, nonpublic information about a whistleblower to the counsel for that whistleblower's employer, a major Wall Street bank, JP Morgan Chase.
The IG's charges of misconduct grew out of an SEC probe that began in 2003 of JPMorgan and other big financial institutions suspected of illegal market practices.
Demos has denied he did anything improper, and his campaign declined to comment on the matter. But documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) -- a non-partisan non-profit based in Washington -- confirm that Demos was the staff attorney who was cited in the IG report for violating SEC rules.
The IG referred the case to the agency's management for possible disciplinary action, but the SEC took no action. Soon after that, Demos quietly resigned from his job and launched his bid for a seat in the House of Representatives.
But the confidential information that Demos disclosed was used by a JPMorgan lawyer against one of the bank's own employees, a whistleblower who had alerted the SEC to possible wrongdoing by his employer, according to the report and other documents, some released under the Freedom of Information Act.
The significance of the case goes beyond politics.
In response to widespread public anger over Wall Street abuses and a weak economy, the SEC and its latest chairman, Mary Schapiro, have pledged repeatedly to protect whistleblowers and pay more attention to their reports of illegality and market abuse.
The Madoff case itself involved a whistleblower whose information the SEC had largely ignored, and a financial analyst at a prominent Wall Street company said last year that he, too, had trouble getting phone calls returned by the SEC after informing the agency his employer might be breaking the law. In response, the SEC has launched a program to cope with the hundreds of thousands of tips it receives every year, but progress has been painfully slow.
Meanwhile, the SEC also appears to be brushing aside or delaying action on the recommendations of its own IG, and not just in the Demos matter. In response to a recent Freedom of Information Act request submitted by POGO, the SEC has said that since 2007 there have been more than 200 recommendations from its IG on which the agency has either taken no action, or on which action was still pending.
Demos is a 33-year-old politically wired attorney who attended Fordham Law School. According to his campaign Web site, his donor list includes wealthy Wall Streeters and others, who have given him more than $300,000 since October.
His bio includes stints in the District Attorney's office in Suffolk County, Long Island, and service as enforcement lawyer at the SEC from 2002 to 2009.
He was involved in the campaigns of former New York Gov. George Pataki and former Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, and is now in a field of candidates, including Chris Cox, an attorney and the grandson of former President Richard Nixon, who are seeking the GOP nomination in New York's 1st Congressional District, a swing district. The seat is currently held by Tim Bishop, a Democrat, who is considered vulnerable in November.
The SEC IG's findings did not identify Demos by name when they were included in the watchdog's semi-annual report to Congress last year. But documents obtained by POGO, including internal SEC materials and related correspondence, make clear that Demos' conduct lay behind the section of the report on the JPMorgan whistleblower, who worked as a mid-level compliance officer in New York.
According to a redacted version of the report, the whistleblower, whose name is Peter Sivere, first came to the SEC with what he described as "confidential" evidence of the bank's alleged failure to disclose material sought in the SEC probe.
The SEC was investigating a practice known as market timing, which can be illegal. It typically involves trading that favors short-term buyers and sellers to the detriment of long-term shareholders like retirees.
After the whistleblower's initial e-mail contact with the SEC in June 2004, Demos replied to him, confirming, among other things, that the agency's probe was "confidential."
Several major institutions, such as Bank of America and Alliance Capital Management, later reached settlements in similar SEC inquiries, but JPMorgan was never charged with a violation, and this week had no comment.
In July 2004, Sivere brought an employment claim against JPMorgan before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. He contended that the bank began threatening his job after he had gone to the SEC. JPMorgan strongly disputed Sivere's allegations.
OSHA issued a preliminary finding in favor of the whistleblower, saying there was "reasonable cause to believe" that he had faced retaliation, and that his "preliminary reinstatement" was warranted. Not long after, Demos informed JPMorgan's counsel that Sivere had initially sought a cash payment from the SEC for information he was offering the agency, apparently in hopes of benefiting from a well-publicized SEC program to elicit information from tipsters.
The lawyer for JPMorgan then used Sivere's confidential request for a bounty to question his whistleblower credentials, and informed OHSA that he had asked for money. Apparently concerned that this had damaged his case, despite the initial finding in his favor, Sivere then dropped his complaint against JPMorgan and settled the case.
A well-known Washington securities lawyer who did not want his name used in a discussion of the sensitive case explained that "whistleblowers are often unfairly disparaged for requesting payments, even though U.S. law specifically authorizes rewards to certain informants." JPMorgan has denied any impropriety. It ultimately fired Sivere in October 2004.
In October 2008, the SEC's IG launched its own investigation in response to information from Sivere. Its final report provided a description of what it said was Demos' improper disclosure, as well as an earlier, internal SEC examination of the matter.
Demos, when first questioned by an SEC supervisor, "did not admit" to the improper disclosure, the IG report says, though he did concede he might have been responsible, saying he "did not remember."
Based on that inconclusive evidence, Demos' SEC superior drew no definite conclusion about whether Demos had made the disclosure. Even so, he formally "counseled" Demos in late 2005 about the importance of keeping protected information within the agency, the IG said.
The IG later interviewed Demos' SEC superior and others at the agency. The IG also contacted lawyers for JPMorgan, including one to whom the disclosure had been made. That lawyer readily identified Demos as the source of his information, according to documents.
As the IG report concludes, Demos "not only gave . . . JPMorgan permission to use the non-public information about an informant against him [in the OHSA proceeding], but actually encouraged such use."
The IG found that Demos' disclosure was a violation of SEC rules, which severely restrict the release of confidential information obtained in the course of an investigation.
The failure of Demos' campaign to let prospective voters know about any of these events may not be surprising, but only days after he launched his run for Congress on Oct. 13, 2009, candidate Demos sent a two-page letter rebutting charges of ethical misconduct in the SEC matter that had surfaced in another forum: the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, which reviews and investigates ethical complaints against lawyers.
Upset that the SEC was doing nothing in response to its own IG's disciplinary referral, the New York ethics complaint naming Demos was filed by Sivere, the fired whistleblower. Demos' letter in response to that complaint argued that it was "entirely without merit."
The complaint has yet to be resolved, but could result in a finding of no wrongdoing or penalties ranging from censure to disbarment.
In his letter to the Supreme Court's Disciplinary Committee, Demos concedes that information about the whistleblower may have been released, but only in line with SEC "regulations and policies." Demos' statement appears to be at odds with the IG's finding.
His letter also attacks the protected status of the whistleblower's information, arguing that the one time JPMorgan employee "was owed no duty of confidentiality or loyalty by the Commission [SEC] or me" -- another statement that contradicts the IG's conclusions.
Michael Smallberg is an investigator at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO). Adam Zagorin is Journalist in Residence at POGO. POGO is a non-partisan, non-profit government watchdog group based in Washington, D.C.""
Source
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/28/long-island-congressional-candidate-cited-for-giving-up-jpmorgan/
I do not believe that the SEC even Tries to Check on Reports or Tips... I believe that the SEC, Mary Schapiro looks at who the "Names" and "Players" are and decides from there whether to look into it or not.. the Iviewit Trillion Dollar Stolen Patent Case Shows this VERY Well... as the SEC, Mary Schapiro knows full well of a Massive Shareholder Fraud and they DO NOTHING.. they don't even seem to acknowledge it has been reported...
more on the iViewit Stolen Patent at
www.Iviewit.TV and www.DeniedPatent.com
and More on Mary Schapiro Click Here
the Obama Administration Brags about new laws to protect Whistleblowers... Laws seem to be in place but in the Real World Whistleblowers are Treated as Criminals and their Lives are turned upside down...
But one case that never made headlines was his own: Demos' campaign Web site and public statements omit any reference to a report last March of the SEC's Inspector General (IG), which found he had improperly disclosed protected, nonpublic information about a whistleblower to the counsel for that whistleblower's employer, a major Wall Street bank, JP Morgan Chase.
The IG's charges of misconduct grew out of an SEC probe that began in 2003 of JPMorgan and other big financial institutions suspected of illegal market practices.
Demos has denied he did anything improper, and his campaign declined to comment on the matter. But documents obtained by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) -- a non-partisan non-profit based in Washington -- confirm that Demos was the staff attorney who was cited in the IG report for violating SEC rules.
The IG referred the case to the agency's management for possible disciplinary action, but the SEC took no action. Soon after that, Demos quietly resigned from his job and launched his bid for a seat in the House of Representatives.
But the confidential information that Demos disclosed was used by a JPMorgan lawyer against one of the bank's own employees, a whistleblower who had alerted the SEC to possible wrongdoing by his employer, according to the report and other documents, some released under the Freedom of Information Act.
The significance of the case goes beyond politics.
In response to widespread public anger over Wall Street abuses and a weak economy, the SEC and its latest chairman, Mary Schapiro, have pledged repeatedly to protect whistleblowers and pay more attention to their reports of illegality and market abuse.
The Madoff case itself involved a whistleblower whose information the SEC had largely ignored, and a financial analyst at a prominent Wall Street company said last year that he, too, had trouble getting phone calls returned by the SEC after informing the agency his employer might be breaking the law. In response, the SEC has launched a program to cope with the hundreds of thousands of tips it receives every year, but progress has been painfully slow.
Meanwhile, the SEC also appears to be brushing aside or delaying action on the recommendations of its own IG, and not just in the Demos matter. In response to a recent Freedom of Information Act request submitted by POGO, the SEC has said that since 2007 there have been more than 200 recommendations from its IG on which the agency has either taken no action, or on which action was still pending.
Demos is a 33-year-old politically wired attorney who attended Fordham Law School. According to his campaign Web site, his donor list includes wealthy Wall Streeters and others, who have given him more than $300,000 since October.
His bio includes stints in the District Attorney's office in Suffolk County, Long Island, and service as enforcement lawyer at the SEC from 2002 to 2009.
He was involved in the campaigns of former New York Gov. George Pataki and former Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, and is now in a field of candidates, including Chris Cox, an attorney and the grandson of former President Richard Nixon, who are seeking the GOP nomination in New York's 1st Congressional District, a swing district. The seat is currently held by Tim Bishop, a Democrat, who is considered vulnerable in November.
The SEC IG's findings did not identify Demos by name when they were included in the watchdog's semi-annual report to Congress last year. But documents obtained by POGO, including internal SEC materials and related correspondence, make clear that Demos' conduct lay behind the section of the report on the JPMorgan whistleblower, who worked as a mid-level compliance officer in New York.
According to a redacted version of the report, the whistleblower, whose name is Peter Sivere, first came to the SEC with what he described as "confidential" evidence of the bank's alleged failure to disclose material sought in the SEC probe.
The SEC was investigating a practice known as market timing, which can be illegal. It typically involves trading that favors short-term buyers and sellers to the detriment of long-term shareholders like retirees.
After the whistleblower's initial e-mail contact with the SEC in June 2004, Demos replied to him, confirming, among other things, that the agency's probe was "confidential."
Several major institutions, such as Bank of America and Alliance Capital Management, later reached settlements in similar SEC inquiries, but JPMorgan was never charged with a violation, and this week had no comment.
In July 2004, Sivere brought an employment claim against JPMorgan before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. He contended that the bank began threatening his job after he had gone to the SEC. JPMorgan strongly disputed Sivere's allegations.
OSHA issued a preliminary finding in favor of the whistleblower, saying there was "reasonable cause to believe" that he had faced retaliation, and that his "preliminary reinstatement" was warranted. Not long after, Demos informed JPMorgan's counsel that Sivere had initially sought a cash payment from the SEC for information he was offering the agency, apparently in hopes of benefiting from a well-publicized SEC program to elicit information from tipsters.
The lawyer for JPMorgan then used Sivere's confidential request for a bounty to question his whistleblower credentials, and informed OHSA that he had asked for money. Apparently concerned that this had damaged his case, despite the initial finding in his favor, Sivere then dropped his complaint against JPMorgan and settled the case.
A well-known Washington securities lawyer who did not want his name used in a discussion of the sensitive case explained that "whistleblowers are often unfairly disparaged for requesting payments, even though U.S. law specifically authorizes rewards to certain informants." JPMorgan has denied any impropriety. It ultimately fired Sivere in October 2004.
In October 2008, the SEC's IG launched its own investigation in response to information from Sivere. Its final report provided a description of what it said was Demos' improper disclosure, as well as an earlier, internal SEC examination of the matter.
Demos, when first questioned by an SEC supervisor, "did not admit" to the improper disclosure, the IG report says, though he did concede he might have been responsible, saying he "did not remember."
Based on that inconclusive evidence, Demos' SEC superior drew no definite conclusion about whether Demos had made the disclosure. Even so, he formally "counseled" Demos in late 2005 about the importance of keeping protected information within the agency, the IG said.
The IG later interviewed Demos' SEC superior and others at the agency. The IG also contacted lawyers for JPMorgan, including one to whom the disclosure had been made. That lawyer readily identified Demos as the source of his information, according to documents.
As the IG report concludes, Demos "not only gave . . . JPMorgan permission to use the non-public information about an informant against him [in the OHSA proceeding], but actually encouraged such use."
The IG found that Demos' disclosure was a violation of SEC rules, which severely restrict the release of confidential information obtained in the course of an investigation.
The failure of Demos' campaign to let prospective voters know about any of these events may not be surprising, but only days after he launched his run for Congress on Oct. 13, 2009, candidate Demos sent a two-page letter rebutting charges of ethical misconduct in the SEC matter that had surfaced in another forum: the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, which reviews and investigates ethical complaints against lawyers.
Upset that the SEC was doing nothing in response to its own IG's disciplinary referral, the New York ethics complaint naming Demos was filed by Sivere, the fired whistleblower. Demos' letter in response to that complaint argued that it was "entirely without merit."
The complaint has yet to be resolved, but could result in a finding of no wrongdoing or penalties ranging from censure to disbarment.
In his letter to the Supreme Court's Disciplinary Committee, Demos concedes that information about the whistleblower may have been released, but only in line with SEC "regulations and policies." Demos' statement appears to be at odds with the IG's finding.
His letter also attacks the protected status of the whistleblower's information, arguing that the one time JPMorgan employee "was owed no duty of confidentiality or loyalty by the Commission [SEC] or me" -- another statement that contradicts the IG's conclusions.
Michael Smallberg is an investigator at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO). Adam Zagorin is Journalist in Residence at POGO. POGO is a non-partisan, non-profit government watchdog group based in Washington, D.C.""
Source
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/28/long-island-congressional-candidate-cited-for-giving-up-jpmorgan/
I do not believe that the SEC even Tries to Check on Reports or Tips... I believe that the SEC, Mary Schapiro looks at who the "Names" and "Players" are and decides from there whether to look into it or not.. the Iviewit Trillion Dollar Stolen Patent Case Shows this VERY Well... as the SEC, Mary Schapiro knows full well of a Massive Shareholder Fraud and they DO NOTHING.. they don't even seem to acknowledge it has been reported...
more on the iViewit Stolen Patent at
www.Iviewit.TV and www.DeniedPatent.com
and More on Mary Schapiro Click Here
the Obama Administration Brags about new laws to protect Whistleblowers... Laws seem to be in place but in the Real World Whistleblowers are Treated as Criminals and their Lives are turned upside down...
Friday, December 25, 2009
JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs and Stolen Trillions. Shut Down the Federal Reserve.
"In response to Mark DeCambres' recent article "Jamie Dimon seen as good fit for Treasury" in the 11/24 edition of the online "New York Post," blogger Crown_Royal observed:
"Well Goldman-Sachs had their turn to STEAL trillions by placing ex-employees into gov. positions, so why can't JP Morgan? I mean it makes perfect sense. The SAME people who created TRILLIONS in debts for the USA and then stole TRILLIONS more in tax dollars, should def. be trusted to run the US Treasury! The Federal Reserve needs to be shut down, they are bankrupting the USA."
JP Morgan
"Well Goldman-Sachs had their turn to STEAL trillions by placing ex-employees into gov. positions, so why can't JP Morgan? I mean it makes perfect sense. The SAME people who created TRILLIONS in debts for the USA and then stole TRILLIONS more in tax dollars, should def. be trusted to run the US Treasury! The Federal Reserve needs to be shut down, they are bankrupting the USA."
Source of Post and Lots of Good Stuff on JP Morgan at Link Below
JP Morgan
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